‘The Fundamental Idea of a Confucian
Environmental Ethics: A Critical Response to Callicott’s Project’
後來改寫為中文，名為：
「儒家環境倫理學之基本觀念：對伽理葛特之構想的一個批判回應」，刊于《鵝湖學誌》第二十五期（台北：鵝湖月刊出版社，2000年12月，頁189-205)。
由於有些學生和朋友有興趣了解一些儒家的環境倫理學的論述，現在把此文的中英文版刊於此。以後再陸續選登一些後續發展的論文，以饗讀者。
儒家環境倫理學之基本觀念：對伽理葛特之構想的一個批判回應
李瑞全教授
國立中央大學哲學研究所
作為大地倫理學創始人李奧波特(Aldo Leopold)的忠實追隨者，伽理葛特(J.Baird Callicott)教授可謂一位環境倫理學界博學之傑出學者，不但是西方環境倫理學界的主要領導者之一，參與了無數重要的環境倫理學討論，而且對許多非西方的環倫理學思想都表現出客觀而同情的理解。此一表現可見於他的眾多著述中的一本大著Earth‘s Insights[1]。此書的價值在於它能摒除許多常是由誤解而來的西方與非西方的環境倫理的觀點；第二，他認為在過去的一百年中，西方正從現代轉向後現代的環境倫理學，而與許多非西方的生態思想更為接近。而且，他對後者的重視較諸一般西方學者為高。然而這並不表示他只是把它們籠統放在一起而不分，他在書中實有一構想，嚐試依大地倫理學和生態學的洞見以建立一全球環境倫理學。
雖然這一構想有其堅實的學理依據，但這一構想有過於自然主義化的地方。本文從儒家的批判角度對這一偉構作一回應。在作出批判之前，以下先釐清他對儒家的一些誤解，特別是在Earth‘s Insights 一書的分析，進而表述一後現代環境倫理學的可能性和其方向。最後本文並論述一儒家的環境倫理學的規模和內容。
一、「仁」之中心地位
雖然本文批評伽理葛特對儒家的倫理學有所誤解，事實上他盡了非常大的努力和建立他的理解在若干著名的漢學家的詮釋之上，故主要的誤解並不是他的錯誤。但是，在西方有一派漢學家把孔子的中心觀念定位在「禮」而不是「仁」，而這是一個儒家學者所不能接受的誤解。在二千多年的中國人與儒者的理解中，《論語》的中心觀念無疑是「仁」而不是任何其他觀念。孔子固然是治禮的專家，也非常重視禮在道德上、教育上與社會政治上的重要性，且強調復興周禮，但是在概念層次和存有地位上，禮仍不及仁在孔子哲學中的中心性和重要性。不但「仁」是《論語》中最常被論及的觀念，是學生所最常問的最重要的問題；事實上，《論語》對仁與禮的從屬關係曾作出明顯的陳述。以下先就伽理葛特所引述的一段文字來作分析[2]，此引文如下：
子曰：「君子義以為質，禮以出之，遜以行之，信以成之，君子哉。」（衛靈公十五：第17章）
在此段引文中，孔子明顯是以義為禮之本質，而義是構成一位君子的道德行為的特質，而禮則是它的適當地實現的方法。義常有一道德地合宜的意指，禮則是此種合宜的外顯的行動。前者乃是道德行為之為道德的成素而是不變的，而後者則可隨時代或情況需要而改變。事實上，孔子認為禮是可以「興革損益」的（《論語》為政第二：第23章）。這種觀點在儒家乃是一共識，孟子一段著名的論說更明顯指出禮因時而變更的必要性：
淳如髡曰：「男女授受不親，禮與。」孟子曰：「禮也。」曰：「嫂溺則援之以手乎。」曰：「嫂溺不援，是豺狼也。男女授受不親，禮也；嫂溺則援之以手，權也。」
（《孟子》，離婁上：第17章）
禮乃是日常生活中所遵守的道德上合理的行為規範，而且常是指較特定的行為模式，如男女授受不親等。禮固然是日常所應遵循的行為方式，但卻不能一成不變。把禮視如最高和最重要的原則，則不免會產生如淳如髡所提出的道德兩難而不可化解。但孟子在此引歸於「權」，此「權」實即是不忍人之心的裁決，而展示出義所當為的道德決定。換言之，孔子在上一引文所揭示的作為道德行為本質的「義」即直指道德本心的要求。因此，禮不可能具有像義那樣的道德理論的地位。孔子、孟子和後代的儒者只接受由仁心而來的道德要求，以避免由於死守禮儀形式而產生的傷害。他們同時強烈批評只知固守禮儀而不化的人為「鄉愿」，是德之賊。
在中國哲學的發展上，孔子的主要貢獻正是把禮建立在仁的基礎上。最常為學者所引的是以下兩段文獻：
子曰：禮云禮云，玉帛云乎哉？樂云樂云，鐘鼓云乎哉？」（《論語》陽貨第十七：第12章）
子曰：「人而不仁如禮何？人而不仁如樂何？」（《論語》八佾第三：第3章）
禮樂可說涵蓋了孔子時代的一切人類社會事務和價值。孔子表示禮樂之有價值只在於它們是「仁」的表現。換言之，孔子不但把禮建立在仁之上，而且把所有價值奠基於仁之上。此即著名的「攝禮歸仁」的論旨[3]。孔子之「仁」乃是「我欲仁斯仁至矣」的人人皆本具內具的道德主體性。仁乃是我們的道德意識，相當於康德所說的實踐理性或自由意志。因此，孔子之攝禮歸仁即表示孔子把一切價值均收攝於人之主體性，即人之道德主體性。
進一步來說，仁是構成一個人之人格價值所在，同時也是使人能與天和道相接之處。踐仁即是實踐天道，而實踐天道顯然不可能限於自我利益之下，而必須擴展以包含天地萬物。仁作為我們的主體性，表示仁即我們的人之為人的價值所在，是我們的道德自我。當然，這並不表示仁所宣示的價值是主觀的，因為，仁所體現的不只是我們對其他生命的不安不忍之道德情感，同時也是一種無私的普遍的理性要求。這種普遍的理性表現使得仁成為把我們連結到天與道的主要根據，因為，天與道所表現的正一種超乎特定種類或界域的普遍價值或道德要求。人之踐仁即是踐行天道，回應天命的呼召。而這種無私的自我要求不可能把自我侷限於私我的利益，而必須推廣而涵蓋天地萬物。孔子說「四時行焉，百物生焉，天何言哉」（《論語》17:19），即表明天道是在天地之變化運行和萬物的生長發育之中，而這一論述對人與自然的關係和自然存有的價值有重要的涵義。雖然伽理葛特沒有利用仁之概念來解讀孔子的環境倫理觀念，但當他依安樂哲(Roger Ames)所稱的「在關係中的我」或「社會的我」為相應於萊斯(Arne Naess)的「生態哲學」(ecosophy)中所說的「大我」(big Self)，卻頗能掌握孔子哲學的生態意涵[4]。但是，儒家哲學中的道德的自我與自然有多於一擴展的自我(extended
self)與自然所具有的密切關係。而且，我們必須指出，孔子或儒家雖常認為每個人都是在一關係中的個體，但並不表示一道德的個體乃是一常常符同於社會規範的個體。君子或一個有道德表現的人常是一獨特的可以作為道德行動者的個體。換言之，道德行為有超乎特定社會規範和局限的創造性，有超乎人類特定時空的具體規範或禮的制約之外的道德創造的特質，而衝破人類作為一物種的樊籬，與天地萬物為一體。
儒家無疑較諸西方諸多哲學或宗教體系具有更強的與天地萬物為一體的觀念。孔子即自覺是天道的承擔者，而宛若與天地之運作同其呼吸，如以「天何言哉」來自況。雖然儒家特別重視人的價值，荀子也有「天不生人，萬古如長夜」之語，但是，儒家從來沒有以自然為人類的資源，並不認為自然乃純為人類之使用或利用而設，反而有「同胞物與」，愛人惜物的表示。孟子雖以人為最尊貴，亦以人之生活得到充足之財用為仁政王道之始，但是，一方面孟子著眼於告戒當時諸侯之不可侵佔資源而有害百姓之生養，另一方面，孟子同時強調人類利用自然資源時，除了應有適當的節制，不可貪奢，更重要的是在使用之中，不可斲喪物種，竭澤而漁，而應使自然資源和生命更為豐盛。孟子強調：
數罟不入洿池，魚鱉不可勝食也，斧斤以時入山林，材木不可勝用也(
《孟子》，梁惠王上：第2章）
同時，孟子和儒家雖著重使百姓的生活富足，但也強調在生活上應盡量節約簡化，所謂「養心莫善於寡欲」，以使人之道德實踐更能隨時表現。
我們可以進一步引用《中庸》的兩段重要文獻，以說明在儒家義理中，「道」的概念和一個有道德表現的人與天地萬物的關係：
天地之道可一言而盡也，其為物不貳，故其生物不測。(第26章)
這是儒家對道的一個明確的說明，即道是生化天地萬物之道，其德即是生生不已之創生。道是客觀的天地之道，是包括人在內的天地萬物的根源。道也同時內在於每個人的生命而為人之性，此性則表現為我們日常行為中的道德的本心，道德行為即是道德的創生。因此，道乃是既超越又內在的。當人體現道於道德實踐之中時，他即與道合而為一而體現出無限的價值。因此，人可以藉道德實踐而與天地合而為一：
唯天下至誠為能盡其性，能盡其性則能盡人之性，能盡人之性則能盡物之性，能盡物之性則可以贊天地之化育，可以贊天地之化育則可以與天地參矣。(第22章)
這表示通過我們真實無妄的道德實踐，可以幫助天地萬物表現其性分而不致受到扭曲。這即是「各盡其性分之原則」。這個原則的充份實現即成就康德所謂「目的王國」。人類通過這種使天地萬物能盡其性分的道德實踐，不但體現道，同時也體現了人與天地萬物為一體的意義。換言之，人類在作道德實踐時即必然同時實現天地萬物之性分，由是與天地合為一體，也成為一與天地同為無限價值的存有。在人類理性之所及來說，天地之化育固然極其繁富，但仍不免有所遺漏，人與物不免有缺憾之處，故《中庸》說：「天地之大，人猶有所憾」，而人在道德實踐方面可以補天地化育所不足之處。故孔子說：「人能弘道，非道弘人」。對天地化育不足之呼喚乃來自我們的道德意識，此即構成人類的「天命」，促使人類盡量去補足天地之化育，使天地萬物能得以各盡其性分。
在《孟子》一書中，孟子即表示了「萬物皆備於我矣」的與天地萬物為一體的觀念。這一觀念在宋明儒者則表示得更明確，如程明道之「仁者與天地萬物為一體」、「觀雛雞可以知仁」等語，即明確指出道同時在天地萬物中體現，而不只是人類才具有這種性能。這表示人與天地萬物乃是存有上同一的，即具有同等的存有地位；天地萬物實有獨立於人類的意欲與判斷之外的價值。此即排除對一切生命，不論是動物或植物，之隨意和不仁道的對待。事實上，儒家對承載天地萬物，包括人類在內的大地向來表示尊崇和感恩，亦視同為道本身。人類無疑是自然環境所孕育和護持的生命，人類也是自然的一部份。對自然的破壞乃是不可容受的不道德行為。這種人與天地萬物為一體之觀念成為人類處理自然事物時的基本原則和第一度防線。
然而，作為一位儒者，程明道也必須對人與物有一價值區分。他認為雖然人與物都同樣具有天地之道而內在為自己之性，但是唯有人能自覺地推擴此性以表現天道，而動植物則不能。這把能推擴天地之道的人類置於較高的價值層位上。但是，位於價值層級最上的人類卻不能離開自然整體的福祉來得到自身的幸福。而且，由於具有道德意識和能推擴天地之化育，一道德的存有對天地萬物的福祉負有更重大的道德責任，即，他必須承擔作為道的一份子而參與天地之化育，因而必須超出人類自我中心的觀點來對待天地萬物。
三、倫理之自然史(A
Natural History of Ethics)之批判
伽理葛特認為李奧波特的大地倫理有進於其他環境倫理學的優點是因為這是一「演化的生態環境倫理學」(evolutionary-ecological environmental ethic)。因為它是一種涵藏在地球演化之中的自然的環境倫理學，而且對這一演化歷程有最完全的說明和最佳的說明能力。是以，我們對伽理葛特依於達爾文思路而理解的倫理學的自然歷史觀不能簡單地視為是某些概念上的沙文主義，或視為是一種企圖連結不可能連結起來的存在於人類文化、種族和個人的主觀觀點。事實上，科學的成果使人類建立起某些共識，成為一日趨一體的地球村，人類整體已愈來愈不可分割。這些都是我們反省和建立一現代環境倫理學所不能忽視的實情。因此，以下對伽理葛特這一觀念作幾點批判的分析。
我們要指出的是，科學的發展是否如伽理葛特意指的是由現代到後現代的發展，還是一種從現代往類似亞理士多德式的前現代的發展，並不是毫無爭議的。這類觀點常有若干猜想和主觀意願的成份在內。要為某一環境倫理學找到科學的支援需要解決兩個重要的難題。首先，科學常出現的典範轉移並沒有常規，很難預知下一波的走向是如何的，也很難知道它甚麼時候會停止，不再出現。雖然，伽理葛特也承認不可能對這一問題給予確定的答案，但是，他仍論辯說，相對論和量子力學已粉碎了牛頓的機械模式，因而得出良好的證據支持他所提出的演化生態環境倫理學。然而，這種論述並不足夠使他的結論具有說服力，因為，就物理理論來說，它們極其量只對某些物理現象或關係給予最佳的說明，過此以往則都只能是安插在物理世界的「生態形上學的」(ecometaphysical)猜想而已。
另一重要的爭議是「實然與應然」的鴻溝。在此，伽理葛特作出大膽的嘗試，把跨越這一鴻溝的論據建立在達爾文對人類作為一自然物種何以如此成功的說明上，即，由於人類具有理性反省能力，促使人類形成族群和國家，而通過群體的力量來控制自然和其他物種。達爾文曾表示人類這種結合的方式可施於全體智人這一物種上，使得所有人類都成為團結一致構成一平等的國度。李奧波特和伽理葛特則祈望人類可以衝破這一物種的障礙，完成一與全體生態平等的生態圈。達爾文式的種族擴大方式不免受到人類中心主義的責難，而且人類的許多悲劇被認為正是由於只停於家庭和種族的層次，而未能進一步推擴到其他生物圈。李奧波特-伽理葛特式的擴展則建基於我們認識到人類是整體生命界和環境中不可或分的一個部份。不但人之生存不可能脫離整體生態而獨立自存，人的身份地位也不可能脫離所處的生物鏈來被理解。但是，這一實況卻不必能排除由於人類自私或停於人類中心主義而破壞了他們良好的願望。如果人類真能超出種類的局限而達到一美好的結果，它必須仍是基於我們對於人類和非人類物種的整體福祉上的道德考量。這種考量也是出於我們所自然地賦有的道德良知或道德理性，這正是使智人這一物種可以超乎物種或人類中心思考模式之外的能力。
智人作為一種物種自然是生物演化所產生出來的一個物種，同時也界定了人類與自然王國和環境的關係。但是，純然作為一物種來說，智人的出現對整體生物界可以有利，也可以有害。在一個意義之下，人類是一個可以使全體生物世界歸於毀滅的一種演化出來的物種。不但人類可以製造出毀滅地球多次的核武器，即以人類繁衍的數量和引起的嚴重污染即足以使大量生物趨於滅絕。生態學無疑告知我們許多關於人類與其他物種和環境的相互關係，但是生態學並不能也不會告訢我們應當如何去行動。倫理學所討論的是一道德的考量，倫理的反省或道德意識的披露，才告知我們應當如何行動才是道德的和理性的。對於儒家來說，這一考量的焦點，最後落在我們對一切生命所具有的不忍其受傷害的道德的本心上，自然之演化歷程只提供一些需要重視和正視的事實和可能性，但不足以決定我們的環境倫理學的內容和方向。
四、儒家環境倫理學的基本綱領
分析過伽理葛特的倫理學自然史觀點之後，本文要先作兩個重要的說明。第一，儒家的環境倫理學並不反對科學資訊所提供的知識，更不反對應基於最新的科學事實、生態知識來作適當的調整。一個基於演化生態學事實的環境倫理學自然勝於一個基於過時資訊的理論，但是，單是如此並不足夠。其次，儒家的環境倫理學正是一建立在我們對所處的世界的道德經驗之上的理論。倫理學是我們對所處情境的理性反省和價值分析。但是，正如科學告知我們將不免歸於一「熱死」或一「黑洞覆滅」，並不決定我們應如何行動，更不意謂我們可以因此而不道德地行動。換言之，不管宇宙將發生何事，作為一賦有道德理性的存有，我們只能道德地行動，否則我們即喪失作為一道德存有的身份和價值。資訊和技能只能幫助我們更好地完成我們的道德命令，此即儒家「智以輔仁」的基本觀點。
自西方開始啟蒙運動以來，三百年的現代化固然成就了人類史無前例的高度文明，把人類在理性方面的優點發揮得淋漓盡至，鞏固了人類統領天地，君臨萬物的權力與地位。但是，現代化帶來的黑暗面也愈來愈明顯和嚴重。人類自身的繁殖即構成一日益嚴重的生態問題，不但由於人類生存所佔用和粍用的自然資源促使地球物種發生大量而急劇的物種滅絕的問題，而人口數量也趨近超出地球所能承載的能力(carrying capacity)之外。這反映在目前地球各種資源的短缺和陷於危機的緊張情況。現代化的後遺症乃引生出後現代的呼聲。當然，後現代化的走向會是如何，一方面有待歷史的驗證，一方面也可以有多個不同的取向。在哲學的層面，後現代的焦點主要是對現代化所著重的理性和普遍性要求，對個體的非理性和獨特性有欠缺足夠的重視，可說是以強調個體的自由為首出的觀點。這一觀點一方面指出現代化所偏重的理論和工具理性的偏差，另一方面則符應現代社會中個人主義的走向，而且有更進一步激化和極端化個人自由的表現。現代化對人類社會的正面貢獻在所多有，如民主政治、合性的社會制度、醫療與糧食之改進等，對人類幸福的增益和痛苦的解除實有不可忽視的貢獻。後現化的問題在於所謂現代性的黑暗面，因此，合理的回應不是取消理性的表現，而是一方面使理論和工具理性回歸其分位，不致僭越，讓實踐理性作主導；另一方面則應重視個體的特殊性或個體性，以免個體受到普遍的理性所壓抑和抹殺而產生自我的疏離與異化。但是，普遍的理性與個體的特殊性都是人類的秉賦。前者即人之主體性，後者是人之個體性，兩者均不可偏廢。因此，針對後現代的問題，儒家的回應強調「人能弘道」的基本模式：普遍的理道必須通過個別的個體在具體情況中體現或實現出來。道固然是價值之所在，但個體乃是道之體現的必需途徑，由是個體的重要性得以確立，而個體之多樣性適足以展示道之豐富內涵。天地萬物之各個種類，各個個體均有其表現道之獨特的姿彩：萬物以其自然形態而表現道之「四時行、百物生」，道德存有則更進而通過自覺以參贊天道之化育。此基本模式在實踐上即是一道德行為的表現，因為，個體在道德實踐中即是通過一具體行為而展現出道德理性的普遍價值，而每一道德行為同時即帶有個體之特色，是個體的一個道德創造，具有獨一無二的特殊性。這一基本模式即是主體性與個體性並建的當代新儒家的後現代化的雙碼論。以下引申此一模式到環境倫理學的建構上。
依上所述，儒家的環境倫理學可陳述為幾個主要的成素。首先，道德行為的要素是一道德存有的自覺的理性行為，主觀方面即是人的仁心、不忍人之心或實踐理性，客觀方面則是天道天理的規範，即要求一道德存有秉持天地萬物為一體的公心公義而行。道德理性要求我們超越任何人類中心的思考模式，要求把自我從特定的種類和種族中心的樊牢解放出來。這是人類在道德思考、判斷和行為上可以超越個人的、種族的和物種的，即人類中心主義的局限的理據。
第二，一切生命都具有同樣的存有論的地位，即，具有同等的原初的(prima facie) 內在價值( inherent value)。各個物種以至每一個體之作為道的一個表現形態，皆具有特殊的價值。儒家承認，任何一個物種都具有獨立於人的價值判斷之外的內在價值，並不待人類的肯認才具有存在的價值。當然，在涉及各個物種的生存和繁衍上，依於自然食物鏈而有的自然淘汰和互相依存的情況，既非人力所可能加以改變或倖免的狀況，因而亦非人類在生存中所能肩負或需要肩負的道德責任。物種的特殊形態表現在該物種的各個個體上，然而，物種作為一整體與物種內的任一個體卻有一種價值上互相倚待和區分之處。在種類上，一個物種不可能由另一物種來表現其特殊形態，而一物種卻可藉由該物種的不同個體來作形態內種種不同的表現，是以，物種之多樣性在價值上重於個體之差異性。這表示儒家認為不可讓一物種滅絕，支持物種之多樣化(biodiversity)，和當一物種瀕臨滅絕時，該物種內每一個體都有更重要的存在價值，然而，這並不表示個體乃是可以和必要隨時為種類或眾多的群體犧牲。不管一物種的數量多少，每一個體仍具有其本有的存在的價值。
第三，人類雖然具有道德區分上的優位，卻不具有演化上的優先性，即，人類的價值並不是因為具有某些生物上的特殊秉賦，因而即具有高於其他一切物種的價值。演化的成果並不構成一個物種的價值高下，正如一隻大鷹的價值不能無條件地被判定為高於或低於一小螞蟻。甚致一人類的價值也不能無條件地，即只作為一生物的種類，而被視為高於一蝗虫。人類只是由於道德自覺的能力和能發揮這種能力，參與天地之化育，方使人類有具有更高的價值，更高的道德地位。換言之，如有其他物種能發揮同樣的參贊天道化育的能力，即，是一道德存有，這一物種或個體即可以具有人類所具有的同樣高度的價值和道德地位。這意涵具有趨近這種能力表現的物種，如黑猩猩，也是我們當賦予近乎同等價值和尊重的物種和個體。另一方面，儒家的道德考量的出發點是生命受到傷害的情況，因此，愈能感受痛苦的物種在道德的考量上也具有相應更重的份量。換言之，儒家可以有條件地認同動物權的提法。
第四，人類的道德行為乃是自我的要求，但這是出於道德理性而非情欲的要求，而且是普遍的利他的而非自利的要求。儒家可以認同人類的價值判斷都出於人類基於理性而來的判斷，因而是人類所認可的價值，但不認為所有人類認可的價值或行為都不可免地是人類中心的表現。在一個意義之下，人類能依於理性而對人類中心主義進行批判，正顯示人類理性並不陏於種類的自私自利的原則。如果人類所建立的科學知識不會因人類死亡而改變，如萬有引力之不因人類全體死亡而不存在星體之間，則可見這些知識雖基於人類的特有感性、知性能力和以人類語言表達，但卻可成為衝破人類中心的產物。同理，人類的實踐理性所作出的超乎人類自身利益的價值判斷，自亦可不限於人類中心的偏差。人類可說是生命演化歷程中首次出現的能夠自覺和自我反省與理解的物種，這即是一突變，而突變的主要功能即是人類的理性，特別是道德理性的能力。人類之理性能力自可突破物種的限制而建立普遍的知識和價值。人類的道德理性也許正是生命演化中的自救的機制，以保障生命不致為自然機制所完全地宰制，使自然王國得以轉化為目的王國。
[1]參見Earth‘s Insight: A Survey of Ecological Ethics from the
Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994)。
[3] 此詞取自勞思光先生之《中國哲學史》第一卷(台北：三民書局，1981年初版)，頁56-68。此意在徐復觀先生之《中國人性論史：先秦篇》(台北：台灣商務印書館，1969年)第四章第四節，頁90之分析實已點出。
[5] 此節的基本理念曾在論述生命科技和動物權時作過分析，請參閱。此兩篇文章分別是“A Confucian Perspective on Human Genetics”，收錄於Ole Doering 編之 Chinese Scientists and Responsibility: Ethical Issues of Human
Genetics in Chinese and International Contexts
(Hamburg: Deutsches Ubersee-Institut, 1999)頁187-198，及“Critical Reappraisal of Animal Right: A Confucian Perspective“，文在香港中文大學於1999年12月27-29日在香港舉辦之International
Conference of Applied Ethics 上發表。
英文版：
A
Confucian Idea of Environmental Ethics: A Critical Response to Callicott‘s
Program
by
Dr.
LEE Shui Chuen
Graduate
Institute of Philosophy, NCU
As
a faithful follower of Aldo Leopold and a good and broad-reading scholar of the
field of environmental ethics, Professor J.Baird Callicott shows his good and
sympathetic understanding of many environmental ethics of non-western
philosophies, especially in his Earth‘s
Insights[1]. The project in that book is valuable first in
that it bridges much of the gaps between western and, very often mistaken,
non-western outlooks of ecological ethics.
Second, that Callicott realized that the western environmental ethics
has changed from the mechanistic modern to a postmodern outlook in the last
hundred years and comes, as he often likes to say, much more close to
non-western ideas than its origin.
Furthermore, he realizes much and in fact has tried to give more weight
to non-western ecological thinking than the prevailing academic air
sounds. However, it does not mean that
he just juxtaposes them together without discrimination. He has a program in mind and try to build a
global environmental ethics with the insight and our knowledge of land ethics
and ecology.
I
find his idea of this program great but a little too naturalistic than I would
like to accept. I shall respond to his
idea of this program in a Confucian and critical way. For this purpose, I shall clarify first some
of the misconceptions incurred in his understanding of Confucianism as
presented in his Earth‘s Insights and
spun out my conception of a Confucian environmental ethics, before making some
critical remarks on his program. A final
review of the possible postmodern environmental ethics is then presented.
I. The Central Position of the Notion of Jen
It
is somewhat unfair for me to charge that Callicott has misunderstood Confucius
or Confucianism at large, as he tried his best to base his upon the
interpretations of some of the well-known and active sinologists. However, it is a general misunderstanding of
the Confucian tradition for a main trend amount sinologists to take Confucius
idea of li as central rather than jen.
It is a common understanding of folks and scholars of Chinese people
over the more than two thousand years of reading and understanding of the Analets that Confucius great idea is on jen rather than any other concepts. It is one of the most talked about concepts
in the Analets and obviously the most
important question often asked by his disciples. In fact, the relation of jen and li have been
clearly indicated by various passages in the Analets.
However,
I shall start with one of the misread passage that goes into Callicott‘s
reading[2]
about li and yi first, and it helps how we should understand the relation of the
two. The passage is as follows:
Confucius said, “ The superior man
regards righteousness(i) as the
substance of everything. He practices it
according to the principle of propriety[li]. He brings it forth in modesty. And he carries it to its conclusion with
faithfulness. He is indeed a superior
man!” (Analets, 15:17)[3]
In this passage, Confucius states rather
clear that i or yi is the essence of li
in that the former is what constitutes the moral characteristics of a moral
person‘s act, while the later is the proper way how it is executed. Yi
also has the meaning of doing things appropriately, but it always has a tone of
moral appropriateness. Li is the overt act of such
appropriateness. While the former is
somewhat the unchanging moral essence of an act, the later could be changed as
times and situations require it. In
fact, Confucius has said that the later could be added, changed or deleted as
time changes (Analets, 2:23). A prominent example is provided by a famous
passage by Mencius:
Shun-yu K‘un said, “ Is it a rule of
propriety[li] that men and women
should not touch hands when they give or receive things?” Mencius said, “ It is a rule of
propriety.” “If someone’s sister-in -law
is drowning, should he rescue her with his hand?” Mencius said, “He who does not rescue his
drowning sister-in-law is a wolf. It is
a rule of propriety for men and women not to touch hands when giving or
receiving things[ching], but is a
matter of expediency[chuan] to rescue
one‘s sister-in-law with hands.”...(Mencius,
4A:17)[4]
The rules of propriety are rules of thumb
and supposed to be followed for the sake of
moral appropriateness in daily affairs.
Thus, li is never on the same
footing as yi. However, Mencius, as well as Confucius and
all Confucians, will only accept the expedience in face of the moral command
called forth by our moral mind or jen
hsin to avoid the harm that would be caused by sticking to a rigid rule of
propriety. Confucius, Mencius and all
Confucians after them did condemn people who stick to rules of propriety for
its own sake without regard to the call of our moral conscience.
Confucius
basic contribution to Confucianism is to base li upon jen. The famous and important passage says as
follows:
Confucius said, “If a man is not humane
(jen), what has he to do with
ceremony (li)? If he is not humane, what has he to do with
music?” (Analets, 3:3)[5]
In s sense, ceremony and music covered the
whole realm of all human affairs and human values in Confucius time. Confucius quest is that all of these have
meaning or value only when they are manifestation of humanity, that is jen.[6] It means he based all value upon the
foundation of humanity as jen. Jen
is the moral consciousness inside us, and it is in a sense equivalent to Kant‘s
notion of practical reason or free will.
Jen is what makes up a person‘s self or
personhood. However, jen is also what connects one with
Heaven and tao. Practicing jen is practicing tao and
this self could not be one limited to self interest, but necessarily extends to
cover all things under Heaven and on Earth.
Heaven or tao is said to
manifest in the natural cycling of seasons and the growth of all things (Analets, 17:19), it has important
implication upon Confucian conception of the value of natural beings and the
relation between man and Nature. Though
Callicott did not employ the concept of jen
as in his reading of Confucius environmental conceptions, he caught Confucius
ecological implications well when he indicated that the self, he called it
after Roger Ames the self in relation, or social self, is more consonant with
the big Self of deep ecosophy of Arne Naess.[7] However, the moral person has a more intimate
relation with Nature than an extended one.
Here I must hasten to add a qualification that though Confucius and
Confucians in general regard a person as always in relations, they do not mean
that a moral person is one that conforms to social norms. He or she is still the unique being that
could act as a moral agent.
II. Man and Nature: All living things are ontologically
he same[8]
It
is no doubt that Confucius enjoyed much with certain unity with Nature or the
myriad things under Heaven and Earth. No
exploitation of Nature as resources for human beings is ever hinted at, nor
that Nature is made solely for the utility of Homo sapien. The use of
natural materials or living things is always for the certain moral ends. There is certain passages in Mencius that taken by some as having at
least a weak implication of anthropomorphism.
However, the contextual meaning of the passages is but a warning for
those ambitious or short-sighted lords of the day, he urges them on the one
hand to limit their exploitation’s of natural resources, say only take those
withering or at least left those budding and young. And on the other hand, the passages present a
basic attitude that we should make more abundant and flourishing those living
beings, whether fishes or trees, when we have to deploy them for our living
sake.
In order to give a more clear picture of
a Confucian conception of Tao and the
relation of a moral person with others and other living things. For the former, I would like to quote a
famous principle from The Doctrine of
Mean:
The Way of Heaven and Earth may be
completely described in one sentence: It works sincerely and thus produce
things in an unfathomable way.(ch.26)
This is a clear
version of the Confucian Tao, the Tao of nourishing and transforming all
beings, producing things, the virtue of procreation of all living things. Tao
is said to be the virtue of Heaven and Earth.
However, this Tao is also
immanent in every human being, in our hsing
(human nature) which manifests through our hsin(Mind)
in our daily practical creativity. It is
thus both transcendental and immanent.
When man realizes Tao in his
or her practice, he or she becomes one with Tao
and manifests infinite value in that instance.
Man could thus form a trinity with Heaven and Earth:
Only those who are absolutely sincere
can fully develop their nature. If they
can fully develop their nature, they can fully develop the nature of
others. If they can fully develop the
nature of others, they can fully develop the nature of things. If they can fully develop the nature of
things, they can assist in the transforming and nourishing process of Heaven
and Earth. If they can assist in the
transforming and nourishing process of Heaven and Earth, they can thus form a
trinity with Heaven and Earth.(Ch.22)
It means that through our sincere moral
practice, we could help to make every being on Earth manifests its mission
without any distortion. This is the
principle of letting every being manifests its mandate to the full. Its realization is what Kant called the
kingdom of ends. The agent is thus
making up any defects a being could have had and is realizing Tao in such acts. Human being as a moral agent is such a self
that encompasses every others as an inseparable part of his or her own
self. The realization of his or her self
necessarily involves the realization of all other living things. Through full realization of tao with moral acts, he or she becomes a
being with infinite value, an incarnated being and as great as Heaven and
Earth. In fact, as Confucius said, human
being is the being that could enlarge the covering of Tao, not the reverse.
According to human rationality, the world process has numerable defects
which human beings could help to improve.
This urge to help comes from our moral conscience, the consciousness of
our Mind, as our mandate. It is no doubt
that human beings themselves have a lot of defects to be make up for.
In
fact, Mencius had already expressed the feeling of being one with the whole
universe, while Neo-Confucians of the Sung and Ming Dynasties expressed this
idea more explicitly. One of the most
renown Sung Neo-Confucians, Cheng Ming-tao exclaimed that:“ The man of jen is one with all things.” He also pointed that it would be a way of
entertaining the procreation of Tao
not to eradicate wild grasses grew on the window panels and could perceive tao while watching a chicken
growing. It means that human beings are
ontologically the same with all (living) things and Tao manifests in all sort of things and forms other than human
beings. Human being is not the only
thing that bears value from the point of view of Tao. This expression of all
things being ontologically the same means that other living things have certain
value independent of human desires and judgments. It precludes any arbitrary use or treatment
of any living things, including trees and fishes. As is well known, Confucianism shows great
respect to Heaven and Earth as the mother and carrier, and sometimes as the Tao itself, for human and all kinds of
living things. Human being is no doubt
part of the environment and nourished by it.
Destruction of Nature is underscored as impermissible implicitly. This oneness with all living things also
serves as a first check on our handling of natural and ecological matters.
However,
Cheng Ming-tao, as a Confucian, had to draw the feature that differentiate
human being and animals. He regarded it
as that human beings could “extend” his good nature begotten from Tao, that is, to act morally, while
animals and other livings could not.
This places beings who could realize tao
at the top of moral hierarchy, however, human happiness is but part of the
holistic welfare of the world.
Furthermore, a moral agent bears more responsibility towards the welfare
of the whole and in many cases has to make up for the defects of natural
process. A moral agent is so to say has
to shoulder the burden of tao and as
part of tao through such
participation, transcends any anthropocentric point of view.
III. Some Critical Observations of A
Natural History of Ethics
It
is a claim of Callicott on behalf of Leopold that land ethic as an
evolutionary-ecological environmental ethic, has a certain priority over other
types of environmental ethics in that it is a natural development of the kind
of environmental ethics embedded in the evolution of life on Earth and is a
consistent and comprehensive world view that could fully or most fully account
for our experience. His account of a
natural history of ethics along Darwinian line of thinking deserves serious
discussion than discharge it out of hand
by just pointing it as conceptual colonialism or bridging an inescapable gulf
between cultures, races and individuals.
Like it or not, scientific fruits bring along certain consensus and a
closer-knitted global village and possibly a homogeneous global culture as time
gone by. Such factors have to be taken
into account for any global environmental ethics or substantial
objections. A brief critical evaluation
is thus in order.
First,
whether the development of science is a sign of development from modern to
postmodern in Callicott‘s sense or rather a backward one towards premodern like
Aristotelian is a controversial one. It
is more of conjectures and has a somewhat subjective whim of wishes. Two further problems need be argued before we
could make good of the scientific enterprise for an argument of a particular
environmental ethics. One is the
recurrent appearance of paradigm shifts inn science and nobody knows how it
turns out in the next and nobody could argue where and when it shall stop. Though Callicott acknowledged, if I read him
right, that it is impossible to give any
definite answer to this problem.
However, he argues that the development of relativity and quantum
physics has shattered the old Newtonian mechanical model and this gives us good
evidence for the kind of evolutionary-ecological environmental ethic he
envisioned. As it stands, physical
theories give at best certain explanations on
physical relations. Beyond that
it is ecometaphysical conjectures impost upon the physical world.
The
other is the old issue of crossing the logical gap of is-ought. Callicott made a bold attempt to place it
upon the authority of a Darwinian account of why human being is so successful
as it appears. It is precisely the kind
of enlightened self that pushes human beings to form clans and nations and with
collective force win over the control of nature and other living things. Darwin expressed the hope for extension to
all members of the species of Homo
sapiens, while Leopold and Callicott hope it would burst the species
barriers one day. The Darwinian type
could not escape the charge of anthropocentrism at best and may account for
many of the human calamities throughout history when it stop at the family or
ethnic level. The Leopold-Callicott type
relies on our realization that ecologically we are just part of an inseparable
whole of the living world and the environment.
However, it could not preclude that our selfishness could go against the
grind and ruin their hope. If it ever
goes beyond that and be a good thing, it must be based upon our moral
considerations of all human and non-human welfare. It relies on our natural endowment of moral
conscience or moral reason, which is what could really take Homo sapiens to make considerations
beyond a species or anthropocentric way of thinking.
It
is no doubt that evolution brings up the appearance of beings such as Homo sapiens, it shapes its relation
with the living kingdom and the environment.
However, as it stands, it is not easy to judge whether it is for the
goods or ills of the whole. In a sense,
human being is the species that could make a self destructive termination of
the whole living world that the ladder of evolution ever has had. Ecology tells us a lot of our inter-relation
with other living thing and the environment, however, ecology could not command
us to do what ought to do. Ethics is a
moral consideration. For the Confucians
it falls squarely back to our moral concerns with the sufferings of all living
things.
IV. Preliminaries of a Confucian
Environmental Ethics
After
this attenuating discussion of the program suggested by Callicott, I must
hastened to add two remarks. First, a
Confucian environmental ethics is not one against the input of scientific
information, nor renews its thinking upon new facts. An evolutionary-ecologically informed
environmental ethics is certainly a good one over one based upon outdated
data. Second, a Confucian one is just
one built upon our moral experience of the world around us. Ethics is a rational reflection of our moral
acts in response to our situations. A
bound-to-be hot death universe or a black collapsed one do not determine how we
act, non does it justifies us to act immorally.
In a sense, whatever happens in the universe, as an agent endowed with
moral reason, we have to act morally, otherwise we lose our special status of
being human. Information helps to make
our moral command more workable.
To
put it simply, there are a few salient elements of a Confucian environmental
ethics that could make a difference. First,
all living beings are ontologically the same, we are all in the family. Second, moral reason requires us to transcend
any form of anthropocentric mode of thinking and is what could release us from
such species confinement. Third, we have
no evolutionary priority but moral differentiations among our dealings with
non-human beings. Fourth, every living
being has a certain kind of inherent value independent of the judgment of human
beings. Fifth, our moral acts are self
imposing but not self interest oriented, nor egoistic. All human acts come from human beings, but
not all human acts are necessarily anthropocentric. Moral reason may be the self salvation
mechanism of the evolution of living organisms.
[1] Earth‘s Insight: A Survey of
Ecological Ethics from the Mediterranean Basin to the Australian Outback,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994.
[2] Earth‘s Insight,
pp.80-81.
[3] Quoted from the translation by Wing-tsit Chan in his A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p.43. Though there are subtle difference in
understanding between his and mine of many of the passages of the Analets, I shall, for the sake of
simplicity, adopt his translations as far as possible and enumerate the
difference in my explanations of the quoted passages.
[4] Ibid., p.75.
[5] Ibid., p.24.
[6] Cf passages such as 17:10, 17:21.
[7] Earth‘s Insight, pp.82.
[8] I have drawn upon my exposition of the main theme of this section
from my previous two papers though they discuss topics on biotechnology and
animal rights rather than environmental ethics per se. These two papers are, “A Confucian
Perspective on Human Genetics”, in Ole Doring (ed.) Chinese Scientists and Responsibility: Ethical Issues of Human Genetics
in Chinese and International Contexts (Hamburg: Deutsches Ubersee-Institut,
1999), pp.187-198, and “Critical Reappraisal of Animal Right: A Confucian
Perspective,“ a paper present in the International Conference of Applied Ethics
held by the Chinese University of Hong Kong,, Dec. 27-29, 1999, Hong Kong.
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